The command acquisition executive shall have the authority to—. I negotiate memoranda of agreement with the military departments to carry out the acquisition of equipment, material, supplies, and services described in subparagraph A on behalf of the command;.
II supervise the acquisition of equipment, material, supplies, and services described in subparagraph A , regardless of whether such acquisition is carried out by the command, or by a military department pursuant to a delegation of authority by the command;. III represent the command in discussions with the military departments regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer; and. IV work with the military departments to ensure that the command is appropriately represented in any joint working group or integrated product team regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer.
D The staff of the commander shall include an inspector general who shall conduct internal audits and inspections of purchasing and contracting actions through the special operations command and such other inspector general functions as may be assigned. It does not refer to the exercise of authority, direction, and control of operational matters that are subject to the operational chain of command of the commanders of combatant commands or the exercise of authority, direction, and control of personnel, resources, equipment, and other matters that are not special operations-peculiar that are the purview of the armed forces.
Such regulations shall include authorization for the commander of such command to provide for operational security of special operations forces and activities. C are designated as special operations forces by the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary of a military department does not concur in the recommended level of funding with respect to any such unit that is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, the commander shall include with the budget proposal submitted to the Secretary of Defense the views of the Secretary of the military department concerning such funding.
If the commander of that command does not concur in the recommended level of funding with respect to reserve component special operations units, the Secretary shall include with the budget proposal submitted to the Secretary of Defense the views of the commander of that command.
The National Security Act of , referred to in subsec. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables. J and struck out former subpar. J which read as follows: "Monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers. C and redesignated former subpar. The staff of the commander shall include an inspector general who shall conduct internal audits and inspections of purchasing and contracting actions through the special operations command and such other inspector general functions as may be assigned.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, with the advice and assistance of the commander of the special operations command, shall provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of program recommendations and budget proposals to be included in such major force program category.
Section, added Pub. II for cyber operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the cyber command, with respect to all matters covered by section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year Public Law —92 ; Stat. B The authority, direction, and control exercised by the Principal Cyber Advisor for purposes of this section is authority, direction, and control with respect to the administration and support of the cyber command, including readiness and organization of cyber operations forces, cyber operations-peculiar equipment and resources, and civilian personnel.
C Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing the Principal Cyber Advisor authority, direction, and control of operational matters that are subject to the operational chain of command of the combatant commands or the exercise of authority, direction, and control of personnel, resources, equipment, and other matters that are not cyber-operations peculiar and that are in the purview of the armed forces.
A ensuring the combat readiness of forces assigned to the cyber command; and. B monitoring the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of cyber forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the cyber command. C The staff of the commander shall include an inspector general who shall conduct internal audits and inspections of purchasing and contracting actions through the cyber operations command and such other inspector general functions as may be assigned.
Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve cyber operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the cyber command. Former subsec. Memorandum of President of the United States, Aug. Cyber Command be established as a Unified Combatant Command. I also direct the Secretary of Defense to recommend an officer for my nomination and Senate confirmation as commander in order to establish U.
Cyber Command as a Unified Combatant Command. I assign to U. Cyber Command: 1 all the general responsibilities of a Unified Combatant Command; 2 the cyberspace-related responsibilities previously assigned to the Commander, U. The comprehensive list of authorities and responsibilities for U. Cyber Command will be included in the next update to the Unified Command Plan. I further direct that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, provide a recommendation and, as appropriate, a plan to me regarding the future command relationship between the U.
The problem snowballs when a policy challenge affects a large geographic area. Consider a hypothetical but plausible drought and mass migration event in Africa during peacetime. Such a disaster could require humanitarian assistance led by the Department of State and U. Agency for International Development.
They would be supported with planning and logistics by U. Africa Command, which would also address the security implications in a region prone to terrorist activity. Should the drought prompt migration to the shores of Italy, as seen in the past , U. European Command could be mobilized to rescue stranded migrants.
To locate adrift ships, U. As Sen. Actions by American adversaries could exacerbate the coordination challenges. In that same congressional hearing, Gen. Stephen Townsend, who heads U. European Command could add competition responsibilities to its humanitarian tasks. In a scenario such as this, the U.
Agency for International Development and local country teams would be likely to receive requests for similar information from, at a minimum, U. Africa Command and U. European Command. Such requests could quickly overwhelm relevant U.
By contrast, good organizational design tries to minimize many-to-one touchpoints in order to reduce duplicate requests and improve situational awareness.
As American competitors and adversaries expand their global reach, they cross more and more seams of responsibility between U.
For example, Iranian ships that recently traveled from their home ports to the Baltic Sea transited waters monitored by three separate combatant commands — Central Command, Africa Command, and European Command.
With no singular voice prioritizing strategies, engagements, and acquisitions unique to the Arctic, opportunities to promote vital U.
As explained over a decade ago by Amb. The stakes would be even higher if commands were coordinating across seams in the lead-up to potential conflict. In that event, the adverse impacts of losing time and context could be especially pronounced.
Joint Staff guidance on the spectrum of conflict emphasizes that there may be no clear indications that adversaries are moving from peacetime to wartime. Modern warfare requires agility. Yet because combatant commands are responsible for entire regions — which can include areas in conflict, areas traversed by supply lines, and other allied, adversary, or neutral countries — those commands have historically fought wars via joint task forces.
Such task forces, created at the point of need and kludged from forces in theater, create yet more seams of command and require lead time to form that may not exist in a future fight. In the event of conflict, the time and information lost in coordination across seams could mean the difference between winning and losing. Waiting for empirical proof — attained during actual warfare — that the current Unified Command Plan is not fit-for-purpose is an invitation for military disaster.
The problems created by combatant command seams have not gone unnoticed by those in the Department of Defense and Congress. Changes to the Unified Command Plan have on occasion been debated among the services and combatant commands themselves. Generally, efforts to change how combatant commands are organized either involve reassigning responsibilities among them or changing the number of them, neither of which will fix the problems we have outlined. For instance, Israel was reportedly reassigned from European Command to Central Command this year the Unified Command Plan is not in the public domain, and the change has not been officially announced.
To give another example, cyber responsibilities were transferred from Space Command to Strategic Command in the early s before Cyber Command existed. In addition, Africa Command and Space Command were both created in the past 15 years, and there have been proposals to form an Arctic Command.
Also called CCDR. See also combatant command; specified combatant command; unified command. Thank you for stating this. Your email address will not be published. The U. Skip to primary navigation Skip to main content Skip to primary sidebar Skip to footer Search this website. Pin 1. Comments Robert M. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published.
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